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(The following is to be ins e rt ed on page 2 of Brief of Appellant,
after statement of Issues on Appeal . )
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Standard of Review for the first and second issues on
appeal is a correction of error standard.

l

The Standa rd of Review

for the third issue on appeal is a clearly er roneous standard. 2

1 Western
Kane County Special Service District v. "Jackson
Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987); Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138
(Utah App. 1989).

2 This standard, as it applies to the inadequate evidentiary
foundation and the lower court's erroneous view of the law, is
analyzed in depth on pages 32-41 of the Brief of Appellant .

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to utah Code Ann. §78-22(3)(j).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Whether the lower court erred,

as a matter of law,

in

ruling that substantial completion is not the law in Utah.
2.

Whether the lower court erred,

as a matter of law,

in

ruling that the liquidated damage clause was enforceable in light
of

the

fact

that the harm allegedly caused

by the

breach was

capable and easy to accurately estimate.
3.

Whether the lower court erred in finding that there was a

reasonable
damages,

relationship
and

whether,

between
in

fact,

actual
the

damages
actual

and

liquidated

damages

bear

no

reasonable relationship to the liquidated damages under Utah law
and result in an unenforceable penalty.
DETERMINATIVE CODIFIED LAW

1. None

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
This is a highway construction contract case in which the
general contractor, L.A. Young Sons Construction (Young)
State of Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT)

and the

entered into a

contract for the emergency grade raise of a section of 1-80 between
Salt Air and Black Rock (Project).
In 1985, The Great Salt Lake was rapidly rising due to record
2

rain fall.

Waves were washing over 1-80 at the Project site.

UDOT

solicited bids from contractors to raise the grade of 1-80 and,
literally, save a vital east-west artery linking Salt Lake City to
western cities.

The Project was ca.lled "Emergency Grade-Raise and

Slope Protection."
Young was one of four con"tractors who decided to tackle the
Project.

Young's

$2,243,812.25

lower

was

the

than

lowest

UDOT's

own

bid

at

$9,940,893.25--

engineers'

estimate

of

$12,184,705.50.
UDOT set the completion date at October 15, 1985 and specified
liquidated damages of $600 per day for each day the Project ran
past

October

15,

1985.

The

$600

per

day

amount

allowed

adjustment for substantial completion--UDOT could assess
entire

$600

charge

regardless

of

no

(at its

discretion)

the

whether

Project was

.9 percent complet:e or 99.9 percent complete.

the
An

extension was granted to October 25, 1985 and the road was opened
for full use by the traveling public by October 25, 1985.
Some minor items remained to be completed after substantial
completion on October 25,

1985.

affect the use of the freeway.

These incidental items did not

UDOT, however, elected to continue

to charge the full liquidated damages against Young until June 13,
1986, when UDOT stopped charging time.
After

subtracting time

extensions

totaling

85

assessed liquidated damages of $94,800 against Young.

days,

UDOT

This amount

was withheld from Young's contract price and has never been paid.
Young, a large road contractor, defaulted on several other projects
3

and

its

payments

surety,

Reliance

totaling

over

Insurance

$2, 000, 000

Company

on

behalf

(Reliance),
of

Young,

made

thereby

becoming subrogated to Young's claim against UDOT on this Project.
Young also assigned its claims against UDOT for unpaid contract
funds to Reliance.
This suit is a breach of contract action to recover $94,800
which

UDOT

has

not

paid

and

which

is

still

owing

under

the

contract.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Deposition of the Trial Court
The case was tried to the court on March 26-29,

1991.'

UDOT

defended based on its exercise of discretion to withhold $94,800 as
liquidated damages.

Reliance, however, argued that (1) the Project

was substantially complete on October 25, 1985 and UDOT could not
properly

withhold

liquidated

substantially complete,

(2)

damages

after

the

project

was

the liquidated damages provision was

unenforceable because the alleged harm was capable and easy to
accurately estimate, and (3) UDOT could not properly withhold the
liquidated damages because the liquidated damage amount did not
bear

any

reasonable

relationship

to

the

actual

damages

incurred after the Proj ect was substantially completed,

UDOT

and the

liquidated damages clause as UDOT chose to apply it under these
facts operates as a penalty and is therefore unenforceable.
The court ruled that UDOT could withhold nearly $100,000 in
, The trial involved two main issues.
The first issue dealt
with an interpretation of the UDOT-drafted Specifications regarding
cushion-course material for which Young made a clam of $573,383.
That issue is not before this Court. Only the liquidated damages
issue is the subject of this appeal.
4

liquidated damages after the Project was substantially completed.
Reliance,

believing the t:rial court's one finding of fact

regarding liquidated damages to be in error, and, noting what it
respectfully submits are serious errors of law regarding liquidated
damages, elected to appeal to this Court and seek a reversal of
these errors.
C. Designation of the Parties
The following defines the relationship of the parties, and the
designation of the parties during trial and on this appeal:
RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY (Heliance), surety (subrogated to
Young's claims against UDOT) , PLAINTIFF and APPELLANT.
L.A.

YOUNG

SONS

CONSTR.uCTION

(Young),

general

contractor

(Principal of Reliance and General Contractor to UDOT) , NOT A PARTY
TO THIS APPEAL.
UTAH

DEPARTMENT

OF

TRANSPORTATION

(UDOT),

owner

of

the

Project, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Reliance's

predecessor

in

interest,

L.A.

Young

Sons

Construction Company (Young) was the successful bidder on the U·tah
Department of Transportation Project designated as Project No. IR80-3(95)102, Black Rock to Old Salt Air, Emergency Grade Raise and
Slope Protection (Project).'
The bids for the construction of the project opened April 23,
1985,

the Project was awarded on April 30,

1985, work actually

, Findings of Fact, August 2, 1991 (Findings), ,
Transcript (RT) , p. 174.
5

1; Reporters

commenced on May 2, 1985, and a contract was formally signed on May
13, 1985.

A Notice to Proceed was issued May 13, 1985 by UDOT.'

This was an emergency proj ect. 4

UDOT originally set the

completion date at October 15, 1985--the date that marks the last
day on which, by UDOT's policy, asphalt should be laid before the
onset of colder temperatures. l

The contract specified liquidated

damages of $600 per day for each day the contract ran over the
completion date.

The $600 a day liquidated damages amount was the

same for liquidated damages occurring before and after substantial
completion. 6
On October 14, 1985, Young requested an extension of time to
lay asphalt, which extension was granted by UDOT.'

By October 25,

1985, Young had finished laying asphalt and the roadway was opened
for its full and unrestricted use by the motoring public.'
all work was completed by that date:

Not

some signs remained to be

installed, topsoil, seeding and other warm weather landscape work
needed to be done,

and permanent striping had to be completed,

although temporary striping was in place. 9

But that date--October

J

Findings,

~

3.

4

Findings,

~

1; Ex. 1 ,. RT, p. 175, 1. 13.

5

Findings,

~

25; RT, p. 93, 11. l2-17.

6

Findings,

~

26; Ex. 4.

,

Exs. 37 and 38; RT, pp. 94-95.

, Findings, ~ 28; April 4, 1991 Bench Decision, p. 8, 1. 21;
RT p. 190, 1. 16.
9

Findings,

~

29.
6

25,

1985·--is the day on which the project was available for

intended use.

its

As the trial court stated in its Bench Decision,

"the road was opened for,

essentially, full use by the travelling

public [on October 25, 1985].,,10
The sign work was comple1:ed by January 13,

1986.

11

Between

that date and February 25, 1986, Young did not work on the project.
UDOT continued to charge administrative costs to the project during
this period for such activities as measuring pay quantities, taking
core

samples,

plotting

cross"sections,

and

calculating

areas.

12

Young finished the topsoil wor]e and other warm weather minor items
of work on June 13,

1986,

and UDOT stopped charging t.ime on the

Project on that date."
UDOT granted extensions of time totaling 85 days as reflected
in

supplemental

Agreement

No.

12,

which

extended

the

contract

completion date to January 8, 1986. 14
UDOT assessed liquidated damages of $600 per day for the 156
days between January 8,

1986 and June 13,

1986. 15

UDOT withheld

$94,800 and has never paid that amount of the contract price to
Young

or

Reliance,

who

is

10

Bench Decision, p. 8,

11

Findings,

12

RT pp. 200-202.

13

Findings

14

Findings,

~

~

Young's

assignee

and

successor

in

11. 20-21.

27, 28, 29.

27, 28, 29.
~

27; Ex. 57 .

15 originally,
UDOT erroneously calculated the assessment at
$94,800, but UDOT has acknowledged the correct calculation to be
$93,600. Findings, ~ 27.

7

interest. 16
UDOT assessed these liquidated damages preportedly for
increased

overhead

associated

with

completing

the

work.

its
UDOT

calculated its construction and engineering costs for the Project
for the six months of January through June 1986 to be $65,029.79,17
but a large portion of those costs were for activities that UDOT
would have performed whether or not the project was completed by
the specified completion date. 18

In fact, the majority of the work

performed by the UDOT engineering crew on the Project during the
winter months was in measuring pay quantities. 19
For over 30 years,

UDOT has

kept detailed records

engineering charges on each federally aided project.20

of

its

UDOT uses

these records to bill the federal government for reimbursement of
a percentage of these costS.'1

16 Findings,
17

~

This Project was a federally aided

27.

Exs. 64 and 84.

18 RT, pp. 200-208.
John F. Nye, who was UDOT's project
engineer on this project, testified that a substantial portion of
the activities for which UDOT had charged as engineering costs were
costs for activities which would have taken place regardless of a
delay in the completion date.
For example, these acti vi ties
included measuring pay quantities,
measuring quantities of
bituminous surfaces, measuring quantities of untreated base course,
measuring quantities of borrow, performing core sampling, plotting
cross section of the Project, calculating areas of the Project,
rechecking quantities. Id.
19 RT, pp. 200-203, l. 7 .
20 RT, p. 412, ll. 17-2l.
21 RT, p. 408, ll. 14-25.
8

proj ect. 22

The

salaries,

charges

indirect

are

costs

grouped

(which

include

laboratory trailers and utilities),
engineering

supplies,

and

into

such

rental

categories
on

office

equipment rentals,

laboratory

supplies. 23

as
and

testing,

UDOT

keeps

ledgers that show the charges in these and other categories for
each day, down to the penny. 2·'

The information can be produced to

show the totals for six-month period or can be extracted to show
the tota 1 s f or one month. 25
section 108.08 of the standard Specifications applicable to
the contract provides:
. for each calendar day after a specified
completion date that: any work shall remain
uncompleted after the contract time specified
per the completion of i:he work provided for
in the contract the sum specified below [$600
for calendar day is the rate specified in
Addendum No. 2 to the St:andard Specifications
and which was applicable to this contract]
will be deducted from any money due the
contractor,
not
as
a
penal ty,
but
as
liquidated damages for Department's increased
overhead;
(Emphasis added.)M
section 108.08 of the Standard Specifications also states:
The Department may waive such portions of the
liquidated damages a.s may accrue after the
work is in condition for safe and convenience

n

Ex. 53, RT, pp. 162-163.

23

Ex. 64; RT, p. 374.

~

Exs.

64 and 65.

~ RT p. 373, 1. 9 through p. 374 1. 24; p. 408, 11. 11-20; p.
412, 11. 17-21; and Exs. 64 and 65.

M Findings, ~ 26; Ex. 4.
9

use by the travelling public. v
Section 108.06, Determination of Contract Time, provides that
liquidated damages will be calculated as follows:
When final acceptance has been duly made by
the Engineer as prescribed in subsection
105.16 [acceptance J, the daily time charge
will cease."
This case went to a bench trial before Judge Kenneth Rigtrup
on March 26, 27, 28 and 29, 1991.

The appealed issue before this

Court is whether UDOT was justified in withholding nearly $100,000
in liquidated damages after substantial completion of the Project.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The public had full and complete use of the Project on October
25,1985,

at which time the Project was substantially complete.

Under the terms of the contract between UDOT and Young, UDOT was
not required to assess liquidated damages,

but still elected to

impose upon Young the full $600-a-day liquidated damages fine after
the Project was substantially completed.

The lower court upheld

UDOT's decision to assess the full liquidated damage amount against
UDOT

even

though

the

total

penalty

amount

had

no

reasonable

relationship to UDOT's actual increased overhead and the clause,
under these circumstances, operated as a penalty.
The

liquidated damages should have stopped running on the

substantial completion date of October 25, 1985 (or at least should

27

Findings,

~

26; Ex. 4.

28
Ex. 4., section 105.16, Acceptance, provides that the
Engineer will make an inspection and accept the work if the work
"is found completed to his satisfaction."

10

have been reduced substantially to reflect the much lesser costs
incurred by UDOT after substantial completion);

the

liquidated

damages assessed against Young bear no reasonable relationship to
the actual damages incurred by UDOT; and, under the circumstances,
the liquidated damages clause operates as a penalty.
the

lower

court's

ruling

unenforceable penalty and

regarding
its

substantial

Therefore,

completion

and

finding regarding the reasonable

relationship of the liquidated damages to actual damages should all
be reversed.
ARGUMlmT

The following argument first establishes in Point 1 that 1:he
doctrine of sUbstantial completion is or should be the law in utah.
Point 11 establishes that the actual damages were not incapable or
very

difficult

of

accurate

estimation.

Finally,

Point

III

establishes that there is no reasonable relationship between the
assessed

liquidated

damages

and

UDOT's

actual

damages

and,

therefore, the liquidated damages clause operates as a penalty and
is unenforceable.
Point I
The Lower Court Erred, liS a Matter of Law,
in Ruling that Substantial Completion
is Not the Law in Utah

The lower court's fifth conclusion of law states:
The court concludes that the doctrine of
substantial completion does not apply to the
facts of this case nor is there case law in
the state of Utah to t:hat: effect.
This is error.

The statement is an incorrect statement of

utah law for two reasons.

First, it is error to state that the
11

doctrine of substantial completion does not apply to the facts of
this

Second,

case.

there

is

case

law

substantial completion is the law in utah.
jurisdictions'

to

the

effect

that

In addition, all other

reported cases which have dealt with sUbstantial

completion "accept" the doctrine; that is, substantial completion
is possible without a project being 100 percent complete.
A. The Doctrine of Substantial Completion in utah
Clearly,
performance,
derives.

Utah law does accept the doctrine of sUbstantial
the

This

contract case,

doctrine
doctrine

Stephens v.

completed the work,

from

is

which

expressed

Doxey.H

substantial
in

a

utah

In Stephens,

completion
construction

the contractor

but "not very satisfactorily."

The Supreme

Court noted that the law allows for "substantial compliance" with
plans and specifications:
In this class of cases the law contemplates a
sUbstantial compliance with the plans and
specifications; that any structure should be
so substantially erected and completed as to
subserve the purposes and uses for which it lS
intended. 30
The Court went on to explain how the doctrine of sUbstantial
performance works with the doctrine of substantial compliance:
We may remark, however, that in this class of
cases the trend of decisions in recent years
has been to hold that there must be a
substantial, not punctil ious, performance of
builder's contracts. So, too, it is generally
held that on the one hand the contractor may
not be permitted to profit by reason of his
noncompliance with the contract, while on the
H 198 P. 261 (Utah 1921).
30

rd.

at 198.
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other hand the owner will not be permitted to
reap the benefits of the added value to his
property where, of necessity and in the verv
nature of things, substantial benefits have
accrued by reason of labor performed and
materials furnished t1Y...J:he contractor for the
bui lding. 31
The Court relied on the doctrine, of' substantial performance and
builder's SUbstantial compliance,
stated in the opinion,

th~'

in addition to other reasons

and reversed the trial court's judgment.

The doctrine of substantial completion,
same common sense reasons,

by analogy.

and for the

The reasoning and

appl ies in utah.

analysis of the Stephens case are the same reasoning and analysis
which urge application of the doctrine of substantial completion in
this case before this Court.

f'3.

The Doctrine of Substantial Completion
is Accepted in All Jurisdictions

Liquidated
achieves

damages

SUbstantial

may

not

be

assessed

SUbstantial

completion.

after

a

project

completion

; ,....

~.,

a

principle of contract law which, when applied in a construct.ion
context,

provides that substantial performance of a building or

constructcion contract will support a recovery on that contract. 32
SUbstantial

completion

occurs

when

the

owner

has

the

use

and

benefit of the contractor's work and the project can be used for
its

intended
31

purpose. 33

The

rationale

behind

substantcial

Id--"- (emphasis added).

J2 13 Am. Jur.
2d Building and Construction Contracts §41;' 64
Am. Jur. 2d Public Works and Contracts §106.
33
13 Am. Jur. 2d BuildinE.......i~nd Construction Contracts ~;4 3,
cited in Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Butte-Meade Sanitary
Water District, 500 F. Supp. 193 (D. S.D. 1980); Heinkel v. city of
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completion

is

that

sUbstantial

completion of the work.

performance

is

equivalent

to

Substantial performance is completion in

the eyes of the law.
The factors to be considered in determining whether a project
is

substantially

Inc.,~

complete

are

set

forth

in

Berglund-Johnson,

as follows:
The reported cases considering substantial
completion
as
a
basis
for
relief
from
assessment of liquidated damages generally
look to the percentage of the completed as
compared to the entire contract, the volume
and nature of the uncompleted work, and, most
importantly,
to the degree the work is
available for its intended use in the absence
of the uncompleted item or items."

It is virtually black letter construction law that after a
project has been substantially completed, the owner may not assess
liquidated damages against the contractor.

This rule is based on

the fact that the owner has received essentially what it contracted
for and,

therefore,

to assess the contractor liquidated damages

Corvallis, 510 P.2d 579 (Ore. App. 1973).
~

VABCA No. 965, 71-1 BCA

~

8834 (1971).

35 Id. at 41,073
(emphasis added). See J&A Pollin Construction
Co., GSBCA 2780 70-2 BCA ~ 8562 (1970) (liThe basic purpose of the
contract must be considered, and the real test to be applied to the
question of substantial completion is the date on which the
facilities may first be used and enjoyed by the government for the
purpose for which they were intended."); T.J. Crooks, Jr. ,
Contractor, GBCA No. T-206, 66-2 BCA ~ 5775 (1966) ("Substantial
completion occurs on the date the work is satisfactorily completed
to the extent that the facilities might be occupied or used by the
government for the purpose for which they were intended.); Ray
Martin Co., VABC 333, 4 G.C. 129 (1962); Electronic and Missile
Facilities Inc., ASBCA 10077, 66-1 BCA ~ 5493; and Fischer
Construction Co., ASBCA No. 7264, 1962 BCA ~ 3497.
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when the owner has use of the proj ect would constitute a penal t:y. 36
since a sUbstantial performance is equivalent to completion of the
work,

there

can

be

no

assessment

of

liquidated

damages.

The

rationale is that liquidated damages designed to approximate the
loss

to

the

owner

before

c1ccupancy would

become

a

penalty

if

imposed after the owner is able to use the project.
Courts have recognized t:hat parties to construction contracts
generally do not intend for

liquidated damage charges to apply

after substantial performance of the contract occurs,
part of t.he work is unsatisfact.ory and rej ected.

even when

For example, the

Supreme Court of Nebraska has note,d that a large road construct:ion
contract which includes a daily liquidated damage charge clause
should not be construed as being intended to apply to instances
where

everything under the

limi ted

amount

Similarly,

of

when

contract

incomplete
a

or

building

substantially performed and

thE~

is performed

unsatisfactory
construction

except
gutt.er

for

a

work.]"!

contractor

was

building was in fact used shortly

after the scheduled date, but final acceptance was delayed several
months due to problems attributabl,e to defected design or materi.al,
the liquidated damage delay charge was interrupted not to apply to

36 continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co.
v. Uni.ted
States, 101 F. Supp. 755, 758 (ct. Cl. 1952), cert. denied 343 U.S.
963 (1952); S. L. Rowland Construction Co. v. Beall Pipe and Tank
Corp., 14 Wash. App. 297, 540 P.2d 912, 921-922 (1975).
3"

Yant Construction Co. v. Village of Campbell, 123 Neb. 360,
243 N.W. 77 (1932).
15

days after substantial performance. 38
Likewise,

in S.L.

Rowland Construction Co.

v.

Beall Pipe

&

Tank corp.," the project was a pipeline project for the city of
Everett,

Washington.

The

court

denied

the

city's

claim

for

liquidated damages for the period after the pipeline was put into
full use with the exception of certain punch list items, primarily
clean-up and landscaping, which were still being performed.

In

Rowland,

on

the

February 1,

city's
1968.

water

pipeline

However,

1968,

the

contractor

fully

operational

the entire proj ect was not finally

accepted until June 18, 1968.
18,

was

Between February 1, 1968 and June

performed

landscaping,

clean-up

and

relatively minor portions of work.
The Rowland court held:
We hold that a liquidated damage clause in a
pipeline construction contract, which requires
the contractor to pay the same $150 daily rate
of damages after the pipeline was put into
full operation as before, amounted to a
penalty after the pipeline was put into full
use.
The clause was, therefore, invalid
insofar as it purported to determine damages
after the line was put into full use by the
municipality.
This

prevailing

principle

is

also

recognized

throughout government construction contract cases. 40

and

applied

The Paul A.

38 Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Thorsen & Thorshov Inc., 211
N.W. 2d 159 (1973).
39

14 Wash. App. 297, 540 P.2d 912 (1975).

40 See e.g ..
Two State Construction Co., DOTBCA Nos. 78-31,
1006, 1070, 1081, 81-1 BCA ~ 15,149 (1981); Berglund-Johnson Inc.,
VABCA No. 965, 71-1 BCA ~ 8834 (1971); NorAir Enginerring Corp.,
GSBCA Nos. 2728, 2985, 70-1 BCA ~ 8350 (1970); T.J. Crooks Jr.
Contractor,
see GSBCA No.
T-206,
66-2 BCA ~ 5775
(1966)
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Teegarden"

case is representative of the doctrine of substantial

comple·tion and is similar to circumstances of the case before this
Teegarden was the contcractor on a road project for the

Court.

National Park Service.

Because of rainy, wet weather and flooding

of its asphalt plant, the contractor requested extensions of time
to complete the project,

but the contracting officer denied the
An inspection of work

request and assessed liquidated damages.

dated June 22, 1962, showed that approximately 92 percent of all
work had been completed, with the uncompleted work consisting of
some minor topsoiling, seeding, sodding and
order.

completion of a change

The Interior Board of Cont'ract Appeals concluded that the

project:

was

substantially

complet:e

on

June

22,

1962

and

that

liquidated damages should not have been assessed between that date
and the date used as a completion date by the contracting officer.
According to

the factors

set:

out

in the

foregoing

liquidated damages in this case are contrary to law.

case,s,

First, t.he

emergency nature of the project.--tco raise the grade of 1-80 and
protect

it

from

accomplished.
"was

put

into

being washed

out

by The Great

Salt

Lake--was

To use language fron the Rowland case, the roadway
full

operation."

Exhibit

56

shows

that

UDOT

considered the eSSence of the contract to be the protection of the
("Substantial
completion occurs
on the date the work
is
satisfactorily completed to the extend that the facilities might be
occupied or used by the governme,nt for the purpose for which they
were intended.); Electrical Enterprises Inc., IBCA No. 972-9-72,
74-1 BCA ~ 10,400 (1973); George E ..Jensen, Contractor, Inc., VABCA
Nos. 606, 67-2 BCA ~ 6506 (1967); Paul A. Teegarden, IBCA No. 4191-64, 65-2 BCA ~ 5011 (1965).
4'

IBCA No. 419-1-64, 65-2 BCA
17

~5011

(1965).

road and its opening for public use.
the October 15 completion date,

Mr. Nye of UDOT referred to

which is the last date asphalt

normally is laid, as a date by which the critical purpose of the
Project was to be accomplished. Once again, the entire roadway was
available for full and unrestricted use by the motoring public no
later than October 25, 1985.
Second, although the foregoing cases state that percentages of
completion are not conclusive, this Project achieved approximately
98 percent completion by early December 1985, according to the pay
estimates in Exhibit 63.

In other words, Young was penalized 100

percent of the liquidated damages when the work was 98 percent
complete.
Third, by far the largest portion of the uncompleted work was
the topsoil placement and seeding, which were not critical and did
not impact the public's use of the highway.
significant

weight

of

case

authority

Therefore, under the

cited

above,

liquidated

damages on this Project should not have been assessed after the
date of substantial completion of the project, October 25, 1985.
C.
UDOT's "Contrary Authority" Also Recognizes
Substantial Completion and Does Not Preclude
its Application in this Case.
UDOT has previously relied on a couple of cases which appear
to run contrary to the great weight of case authority.
relied

upon

Department

by
of

UDOT,

Ledbetter

Transportation,"

Bros.
and

Sutter

" 314 S.E.2d 761 (N.C. App. 1984).
18

Inc.

v.

North

Corp.

v.

The cases
Carol ina
Tri-Boro

Munici2£l Authority,43 do not undermine the principles established
by the considerable case authority cited above.

At first blush,

Ledbetter appears to be similar factually to the case at hand, but
closer scrutiny reveals critical distinctions.
First, there is no mention in Ledbetter of the percentage or
dollar amount that was uncompleted at the scheduled completion
date.

We do not know how much of the contract was complete.

Second,

the

specification

stated

that

delay

would

"result

in

damages due to public inconvenience, obstruction of traffic, [and]
interference with business"
inspection,

in addition to increased engineering,

and administrative costs.

By contrast,

in the case

before this Court, by far the larg'est portion of uncompleted work
was landscaping, which did no't impact the safety or convenience of
the

public.

The

UDOT

specification

specification are different.

and

the

North

Carolina

UD01"s specification does not state

that the purpose of the liquidated damages is to compensate for
damage due to public inconvenience,

obstruction to traffic,

or

interference with business, all of which were considerations under
the Ledbetter specification.

In any event, none of those public

interests were implicated by the lack of landscaping on 1-80.
Third,
sUbsta:C\tial

Ledbetter gave only
completion.

The

lip service to

court

rej ected

the

the

issue

of

concept

of

sUbstantial completion without discussing or citing any cases.
There was no analysis.
enumerated
~ 487

above,

the

It is possible that, using the criteria
court

in

Ledbetter

A.2d 933 (Pa. Super. 1985).
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would

have

properly

concluded that the highway in that case was not available for its
intended use in the absence of properly functioning guard-rails and
signs.

But, to the extent the case simply rejects out-of-hand the

doctrine of sUbstantial completion, it is clearly in the minority
and goes against the sUbstantial weight of case authority dealing
with substantial completion.
The

Sutter court

did

substantial completion.

not

adequately

address

the

issue

of

It is not possible to determine from the

discussion of the "extensive deficiencies"

in the sewer treatment

facility whether those deficiencies restricted the intended use of

•

the facility .

We simply cannot know whether the project was in

"full operation" or "available for its intended purpose."

In this

case, the incomplete landscaping did not restrict the full use of
1-80 and 1-80 was in "full operation."
Fourth,

even

where

the

relevant

specifications

refer

to

"completion" and failure to "complete the work by the completion
date"

(as

in Ledbetter,

Sutter and this

substantial completion applies.
Co.,~

case)

the doctrine

of

In Appeal of Powers Contracting

the contract provision regarding liquidated damages required

the contractor to pay liquidated damages for each calendar day of
delay until the work was "completed or accepted."
stated:

The appeal board

"It does not say that liquidated damages are payable for

the time after completion.

A substantial performance is completion

~ ASBCA 1430 (1985), guoted in 5 McBride & Wachtel, Government
Contracts § 37.130.
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e

in the eyes of the law.

,,45

Likewise, in Appeal of

Roqer'~,

46

the appeal board stated:

If the phrase "completed or accepted" be given
the construction adoptE,d by the contracting
officer, appellant will be forced to pay
liquidated damages for a delay of 122 days in
one contract and a delay of 88 days in the
other, during which th,~ government had full
utilization
of
all
the
facilities
he
contracted to construct, all because he had to
perform the most trivial sort of work, both in
character and amount, after the completion
dates of the contract.
That result would be
so unreasonable, irrational, and inequitable,
that the provision for liquidated damages
would be a penalty, in effect, and therefore
invalid and unenforceable. The parties could
not
have
intended
such
an
absurd
and
oppressive result at. the time they made the
contract.
To the extent UDOT argues that the doctrine of sUbstantial
completion is not applicable to its specifications,

it likewise

argues for an oppressive result that renders its liquidated damages
provision a penalty.
D. In Refusing to hill,ly the Doctrine of
SUbstantial Comple,tion. the Lower Court
Sanctions thp Enforcement of
an Improper Penalty.
The underlying basis for applying the doctrine of substantial
comple,tion under these circumst:ances is that the contractor should
not

be

forced

to pay

full

liquidated damage

charges when

the

Project is substantially completed--fully completed as far as the
public

was

concerned.

Why

should

a

contractor

who

has

substantially performed 99.9 percent of a contract be forced to pay
45

Id. at 34-83 (emphasis added).

u WDBCA 197, lCCF 841 (1943).
21

•

100 percent of the same liquidated damages as the contractor who
only performed .9 percent?
UDOT was not forced to assess this
project that was substantially complete.

$100,000 penalty on a
On the contrary, UDOT's

own specifications state:
The Department may waive such portions of the
liquidated damages as may accrue after the
work is in condition for safe and convenient
use by the traveling public. 4 ?
Further, UDOT actually advanced the doctrine of substantial
completion to the Federal Highway Administration in an attempt to
gain a time extension for Young which would have meant a release of
the $100,000 penalty held by UDOT.

Mr. Bert L. Taylor, who was

UDOT's Engineer for Construction, wrote the following petition in
favor of the doctrine of substantial completion to the FHWA:
UDOT's position on the above problem is we
feel there should be some flexibility in the
charging of liquidated damages.
There are
times when neither the public nor UDOT is
inconvenienced by the extension of time and
the position of Mr.
Howell
[substantial
completion] seems to be the correct one.
There are other times when either the public
or UDOT is experiencing inconveniences and
full liquidated damages should apply to force
the contractor into completion.~
The lower court's limited response to UDOT's former (and our
present)

request for application of the doctrine of substantial

completion is this:

47

Ex. 4,

§

"This Court declines to make a better contract

108.08.

4'
Ex. 59; RT, pp. 164-166.
Implicit in Mr. Taylor's
statement, "There are other times..
"is that this situation is
not one of those other times that merits liquidated damages.

22

for the party than they have made for themselves.

,,49

This response
Corp.,~

is from a case, Ted R. Brown & Associates Inc. v. Carnes
which

the

lower

Decision."

court

cited

and

reI ied

upon

in

its

BE'.nch

The Carnes case, upon which the lower court relied,

does not even deal with the issue of liquidated damages.

The case

stands. for the proposition that where a

contract is clear and

unambiguous, the court will not reform it.

However, the case does

not address the issue of an improper penalty, an unconscionable
clause or an illegal clause, all of Which, even though "clear and
unambiguous," will certainly not be enforced under Utah law.
fact,

In

the many Utah cases cited in this brief which refuse to

enforce a liquidated damage provision have done so even though the
liquidated damage provisions were <extremely clear and unambiguous.
The

issue

is whether

liquidated damages as

penalty and therefore unenforceable.
was

the

Project

completed

liquidated damage faucet?
rigid approach

for

applied are a

The question remains, "when

purposes

of

turning

off

the

Even if we indulge in the lower court's

for a moment,

ignore the many Utah cases which

refuse to enforce liquidated damages provisions and focus only on
the "clear and unambiguous" meaning of the contract, we find that
the contract is really not so "clear and unambiguous."

The lower

court has fixed its sights on one isolated phrase in the contract
to the exclusion of a fair reading of the entire contract:
o Conclusions of law,

~

7.

~

753 P.2d 964 (Utah App. 1988).

5}

.
•
Bench Declslon,
p. 9, 1. 17.
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When the contract completion time is a fixed
calendar date, it shall be the date on which
all work on the Project shall be completed.'2
Once again, this contract phrase only begs the question:
is completion?

What

Reversing itself from its former advocacy of the

doctrine of sUbstantial completion, UDOT now would have this Court
believe, for purposes of liquidated damages, "complete" means 100
percent complete--totally performed in every single, minute, last
item.

However,

upon

further

reading

of

the

contract's

specification, we discovered that this language actually refers to
the completion date in general.

•

The completion date for purposes of shutting off the flow of
liquidated damages is not the same--or at least it does not appear
to be the same.

For purposes of liquidated damages,

time charge will cease . .

"the daily

[w]hen final acceptance has been duly

made by the engineer as prescribed in subsection 105.16.""
In other words,

the contract's completion for purposes of

liquidated damages is subjectively made by the engineer when the
engineer

issues

its

final

acceptance.

Couple

this

subj ecti ve

determination by the engineer with the express statement in section
108.08

that

"the

Department

may

waive

such

portions

of

the

liquidated damages as may accrue after the work is in condition for
safe and convenient use by the travelling public," and UDOT's rigid
application of liquidated damages obviously becomes a penalty and
unenforceable under applicable utah law which deals with the issue
52

Ex.

4, § 108.06.

'3

Ex. 4, § 160.06.
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of liquidated damages.
Point II
Because the Harm Allegeclly Caused by the Breach was
Capable and very Easy t,o Estimate, the Trial Court
Erred, as a Matter of La'l«, in Ruling that the
Liquidated Damage Cla'use was Enforceable

utah

law

pertaining

to

liquidated

damages

follows

the

Restatement of contracts § 339:
(1) An agreement, made in advance of
breach, fixing the dama.ges therefor, is not
enforceable as a contract and does not affect
the damages recoverable :for the breach, unless
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable
forecast of just compensation for the
harm that is caused by the breach, and

•

(b) The harm tha"t is caused by the breach
is
one
that
is
incapable
or very
difficult of accurate estimation.
The Festatement as quoted a.bove is the law relied upon by Utah
cases

which

interpret

liquidated

damages

provisions.~

A

~ Robbins v. Finlay, 645 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1982); Johnson v.
Carman, 572 F.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1977); Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah
468, 476-77, 243 P.2d 446, 450-51 (1952). Utah Supreme Court cases
have also relied on other similar authorities:

•

In spite of the language of cases regarding
the intention of the parties, there is little
doubt that a sum named as liquidated damages
in order to be given effect must be reasonable
in amount. Under the recent decisions of the
most
authoritative
courts,
the
primary
question seems to be whether the parties
honestly endeavored to fix a sum equivalent in
value to the breach.
This is but saying in
other words that the, n'!asonableness or the
unreasonableness
of
the
stipulation
is
decisive.
S. Williston, The Law of contracts, §779 (rev. ed. 1950), cited in
243 P.2d at 451.

Perkin~,
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discussion

relating

to

the

first

"reasonable relation test,"
page

29

of

this

Br ief .

test

of

this

provision,

is found in Point III,
The

second

test,

the

the

beginning on
" incapable

or

difficult of accurate estimation test," is discussed in this Point.
In Perkins v.
Restatement

and

Spencer, 55 the Supreme Court cited both the

Williston

and

held

that

a

liquidated

damage

provision must meet both criteria; that is, (1) the agreement must
be a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm caused
by

the

breach

and

incapable of accurate
In Perkins,

(2)

the

damage

actually

suffered

must

be

determination.~

a seller of real estate property attempted to

retain as liquidated damages one-fourth of the sales price which
the buyer had made as a down payment.

The buyer had also paid

monthly rent.

The Supreme Court held that the seller's loss was

limi ted to (1)

loss of an advantageous bargain,

damage to or depreciation of the property,

(3)

(2)

any property

any decline in value

due to change in market value of the property, and (4)

the fair

market value of the property during the period of occupancy.

The

court held that the damages resulting from these losses "could be
determined with a high degree of certainty."D

The Supreme Court

therefore held that the liquidated damage provision failed to meet
the "incapable of accurate determination" requirement and refused
to enforce the offending liquidated damage provision.
55

243 P. 2 d 446 (1952).

56

Id. at 451.

57

Id.
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Likewise,

in

Rowland,

the

court

stated,

and

the

city's

engineer testified, that the engineering firm billed the city some
$6,000 between the substantial completion date and the date of
final acceptance.

The contract, however, levied a straight $150-a-

day

all

"charge"

for

work

not

completed--even

for

work

remained after the pipeline was put into full operation.

which

The court

then s:tat:ed the law regarding how liquidated damage provisions rmst
be

draftE~d:

In drafting liquidated damages clauses, care
should be taken to seE' that, if the clause
applies to breaches of varying seriousness,
the amount to be paid is: adjustable to fit the
probable damage. 5
The

Court

then

held tha1:,

in

addition to

the

charge

not

constitut:ing a reasonable forecast: of compensation, there was also
no

"real difficulty

in

ascert:aining the damages

that

'would be

caused by such breaches once that point in work was reached.

,,'9

The Court further stated:
The liquidated damages clause was, therefore,
unenforceable after February 1, 1968 [the date
of substantial completion] since after that
date it had an in terrorem effect of inducing
a performance rather then the permitted effect
of compensating for loss.w
In

this

case,

the

undisputed

facts

presented

at

trial

established that the harm of which UDOT complains--its "increased
overhead"--was highly capable and easy to accurately estimate at
5>:

Rowland, 540 P.2d at 922" citing C. McCormick, Damages § 156

(1935) .
~

540 P.2d at 922.

6{)

Id....!..,.
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the time the contract was executed,
test.

UDOT

charges and,

actually

records

in

thereby failing the second

great

detail

its

engineering

based upon those charges, produces an estimate that

appears in UDOT' s

standard Specif ications. 61

The very nature of

the information from which it is derived belies the notion that
UDOT's "increased overhead"

(the criterion of compensation used in

its liquidated damage specifications) is difficult to ascertain."
UDOT's only possible reply to this rather clear statement of
law is that UDOT is damaged by other contractors seeing Young's
example and also delaying.

UDOT may attempt to characterize this

"damage" as "incapable of accurate determination."

However, this

reply is unpersuasive for three reasons.
First,

UDOT

has

not

shown

any

correlation

between

one

contractor's delay and an increased propensity of other contractors
to also delay.
to

plug

a

This is sheer speculation which UDOT manufactured

gaping

hole

in

its

basis

for

assessing

liquidated

damages.
Second, and more important, if making an example of Young is
UDOT's reason for

assessing liquidated damages,

this reason is

improper because it is nothing less than a penalty.
UDOT

is

punishing

Young--decapi tating

Young,

placing its head on a pole for all to see.

as

In essence,
it

were,

and

The liquidated damage

penalty has no correlation whatsoever to the actual damages which
61

Exhibits 4, 64 and 65.

" Reliance must acknowledge that there are some limitations to
UDOT's calculations. Margaret Dammaschke testified she could not
tell what activities were being performed.
RT pp. 411-412.
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UDOT may have incurred because of the delay.
cannot support enforcement of

2L

This penal motive

liquidated damage provision. 63

Finally, UDOT's own specifications state that the basis for
liquidated damage is "not as a penalty, but for the department's:
increased overhead."

The dama':Je that the specifications seek to

remedy is not some speculative detriment to UDOT's relationship to
the Federal Highway Administration or to other contractors, but its
increased overhead.

And, as it has been shown, UDOT's overhead can

be calculated with great accuracy.

Therefore,

the provision is

unenforceable under these circumstances.
Point I I I
Because the Actual Damages Ilear No Reasonable Relationship
to the Liquidated Damages and Result in a Penalty
Under Utah Law, the LO'W'er Court Erred in Finding
that There was a Reasonable Relationship
and that the I.iquidated Damages
Provision was Enforceable

To

be

enforceable,

liquidated

damages

must

bear

some

reasonable relationship to the amount of actual or compensatory
damages.

section 108.08 of UDOT's specifications states, "

the sum specified below will be deducted from any money due the
Contractor,

not

as

a

penalty,

but

Department's increased overhead;

as

liquidated

damages

" (Emphasis added.)

for
The

liquidated damages in this case therefore must approximate UDOT's
"increased overhead."

The trial court erred in entering its single

finding of fact and its conclusion of law regarding liquidated

~ "Punishment of a promisor for breach without regard to the
extent of the harm which he has caused, is an unjust and
unnecessary remedy.
"Restatement of Contracts, §339(1).
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damages that there is a reasonable correlation between the damages
UDOT actually incurred and the liquidated damages assessed by UDOT.
Liquidated

damages

of

approximately

$94,000

far

exceed

the

"increased overhead" incurred by UDOT as a result of the continuing
construction activities of the contractor; and, when the liquidated
damages are considered in light of the actual quantity of work
performed

by

the

contractor,

the

liquidated

damages

are

unreasonably excessive.
A. The Amount of Liquidated Damages Must
Bear Some Reasonable Relationship to the
Amount of Actual or Compensatory Damages
In a long line of cases, this Court has established that, to
be

enforceable,

liquidated

damages

must

bear

some

reasonable

relationship to the amount of actual or compensatory damages. M
Various formulations of this rule or test appear in the cases.
In Perkins v. spencer, the Court stated:
This Court is committed to the doctrine, that
where the parties to a contract stipulate the
amount of liquidated damages that shall be
paid in case of a breach, such stipulation is,
as a general rule, enforceable, if the amount
stipulated is not disproportionate to the
damages actually sustained. Bramwell Inv. Co.
v. Uggla, 81 Utah 85, 16 P.2d 913, 916.
It will be observed that in all cases where
the stipulation for liquidated damages was
M Young Electric Sign Co. v. united Standard West, Inc., 755
P.2d 162, 164 (Utah 1988); Allen v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394, 397
(Utah 1986) i Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah 1985) i
Madsen v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1983) i Soffe v. Ridd, 659
P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah 1983) i Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 625626 (Utah 1982) i Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371, 373-374 (Utah
1977) i Young Electric sign Co. v. Vetas, 564 P.2d 758 (Utah 1977) i
Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P.2d 294 (1954) i Perkins v.
Spencer, 121 utah 468, 475, 243 P.2d 446, 450 (1952).
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enforced it bore some reasonable relation to
the actual damages which could reasonably be
anticipated at the time the contract was made
and was not a forfei t:ure, which would allow an
unconscionable and exorbitant recovery.M
In Jacobson v. Swan, the Court used the following formulation of
the rule:
The parties have a right: to so contract [that
all payments which have been made under a
uniform real estate contract will be forfeited
as liquidated damages] and such rights should
not be lightly interfered with.
It is only
when the forfeiture, .70uld be so grossly
excessive as to be entirely disproportionate
to any possible loss 1:hat might have been
contemplated so that -to enforce it would shock
the conscience, that a court of equity will
refuse to enforce the provision. M
In

You~Electric

Sign Co. v. Unit:ed Standard West, the Court

said:
. . . as a general rule, parties to a contract
may agree to liquidated damages in the case of
a breach, and such agTeements are enforceable
if the amount of liquidated damages agreed to
is not disproportionate to the possible
compensatory damages and does not constitute a
forfeiture or a penalty.~
This Court will also look to the Restatement of Contracts
Section

339

for

refinement

oj'

the

rule.

The

Restatement

discussed in Point II on pages 25 to 26 of this brief.
court

apparently

had

the

reasonableness

rule

in

mind

The trial
when

entered its findings and conclusions.

65

243 P.2d at 449 (some citations omitted) .

M

278 P.2d at 298.

67

755 P.2d at 164, citing Madsen v. Anderson.

See also Warner v. Rasmussen, supra.
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is

it

B. The Trial Court's Finding That There is a Reasonable
Relationship Between Actual and Liguidated
Damages, is Against the Great Weight
of the Evidence and was Induced by an
Erroneous View of The Law
1.
The Trial Court Entered a Single
Reasonableness of Liguidated Damages.

Finding

The trial court entered a single finding,
regarding

the

relationship

between

UDOT's alleged actual damages.

the

Regarding

the

Finding No.

30,

liquidated

damages

and

The trial court simply found that

there is ample evidence in the record of "continuing overhead"
which was

incurred by UDOT after the project should have been

completed, and that there is a reasonable correlation between the
damages actually incurred and the liquidated damages assessed by
UDOT pursuant to the contract.'8
Conclusion

of

Law

No.

10

The trial court also entered its

to

the

same

effect.

This

single,

conclusory finding and its related conclusion demonstrate that this
issue did not receive the care and attention that other issues in
the case received.
elaborate

on

this

Only in the Bench Decision did the trial court
aspect

of

its

ruling

regarding

liquidated

damages. 69
Reliance challenges both Finding No. 30 and Conclusion No. 10.
Reliance acknowledges that a trial court's finding of fact will not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous,70 but a conclusion of law is
not entitled to the same deference; a correction of error standard
~

y

Findings,

69

Bench Decision, pp. 8-13.

30.

70 Utah R. civ. P. 52(a).
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applies to conclusions of law.71

A finding is clearly erroneous if

it is against the great weight of evidence or if the court is
otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been
made. 72

"Findings of fact are clearing erroneous if the appellant

can show that they are without adequate evidentiary foundation or
if they are induced by an erroneous view of the law. ,,73

A finding

is deemed clearly erroneous if' this Court concludes that it is
against the clear weight of the evidence. N
The standard of review of findings of fact is governed by Rule
52(a) of the Utah Rules of civil Procedure.

The rationale of the

Rule is revealed by its language:
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the oppor 1tunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
2. The Evidence Fails to Support Finding No. 30
To successfully challenge the trial court's finding, Reliance
must marshal

all

the

evidence supporting the

finding

and

then

demonstrate that that evidence is legally insufficient to support
71 Western Kane County Special Servo Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson
Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah 1987). It can be argued that
the issue of reasonableness is one of law under the cases cited in
part A of this Point III.
72 Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989)
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)).

(citing

n Western Capital and Security, Inc. v. Knudsvig, 768 P.2d
989, 991 (Utah App. 1989), cer1~ denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989)
(citing State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)).
N
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899900 (Utah 1989).
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it even when it is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial
court. 7S

In this section, therefore, Reliance will review all of

the evidence of which it is aware that supports Finding No. 30 and
will in this and subsequent sections demonstrate that that evidence
is insufficient.
The trial court's Bench Decision reveals the court's thinking
behind Finding No.

30

and Conclusion No. 10.

In discussing the

reasonableness of the liquidated damages provision as compared with
actual damages incurred by UDOT, the court referred to two items:
(1)

liquidated

damages

susceptible of
there

was

a

are

difficult

easy calculation, 76 and

"reasonable

damages actually

correlation"

to

calculate

(2)

the

between

incurred and those provided

or

are

court felt
some

in the

not
that

$65,000

in

liquidated

damages clause. n
In discussing the first factor,

that of the difficulty of

determining damages, the court referred specifically to potential
damage to the relationship between UDOT and the Federal Highway
Administration

and

between

UDOT

and

other

bidders.

There

is

evidence to support the court's finding of a relationship between
UDOT

and

evidence

the
to

Federal
support

Highway
the

Administration.

finding

that

the

There
Federal

is

also

Highway

Administration was concerned that failing to enforce the liquidated
damages provision would be unfair to other contractors who had bid
75

Id. at 899.

76

Bench Decision, pp. 11-12.

n Bench Decision, pp. 12-13.
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------------------------

on the Project. 78

Reliance does not dispute the sUfficiency of the
But that is not the type of

evidence to support that Finding"

damages UDOT's liquidated damages specification purports to cover.
The

specification purports

Therefore,

to

cover

only

"increased overhecld."

whether potential damage to the relationship between

UDOT and the Federal Highway Administration or between UDOT and
other contractors is difficult to determine is not the issue.
issue

is

whether

ascert:ainable.

UDOT's

II'increased

The evidence on that issue is clear.

of Margaret Dammaschke and Exhibits 64

is

overhead"

and

The

readily

The testimony

65 demonstrates the

detail with which UDOT keeps an accounting of the engineering costs
on federally-funded highway projects, and the readiness with which
It was also discretionary with

that detail may be retrieved. ')9

UDOT's survey crew chief as to how to mark his time sheets to
allocate his time between different projects. w
The evidence supporting the 'trial court's finding that there
was approximately $65,000 of "con'tinuing overhead costs" and that
there is some reasonable

correli~tion

between those damages actually

incurred and the liquidated damagres consists of the test,imony of
John Nye and Margaret Dammasch!k:e and Exhibits 64, 65, 82, 83, 84,
and 89.
Taking chronologically the testimony of these two witnesses
most

supportive

of

Finding

78

RT, pp. 164-169.

~

RT, pp. 407-411.

W

RT, p. 207, 11. 10-12.

No.

30,

.,

3"

there

is

first

the

cross-

examination of Mr.

Nye.

Mr.

Nye was

called

as

a

witness

by

Reliance even though he was the Project Engineer for UDOT and is
employed by UDOT.

He testified that as of January 13, the Project

was 89 percent complete. 81

At 89 percent complete, there would be

approximately $1,100,000 left to complete. 82

He testified further

that as of June 13, 1986, the Project was 95 percent complete.~
UDOT's counsel then attempted to elicit testimony from Mr. Nye
regarding Exhibit 64.
his

testimony

on

The court sustained several objections to
Mr.

foundation. '"

Nye

did

conf irm

that

the

charges on Exhibit 64 were the sort of charges that would have been
ongoing during December for his crew on the Black Rock Project. 8l
On

redirect

examination

by

Reliance's

counsel,

Mr.

Nye

admitted that $1,100,000 of uncompleted work was overstated" and

81

RT, pp. 243-244; Ex. 34, Sheet 38.

82

RT, p. 244.

83

RT, p. 246; Ex. 34, Sheet 59.

'" RT, pp. 252-256.
8l RT, p. 252, 11. 16-19.
UDOT attempted to include December
engineering charges shown on Exhibit 64 in the total engineering
charges,
in an effort to show that there is a reasonable
relationship between the liquidated damages of $93,600 and the
total engineering charges.
RT, pp. 248-251 and Ex. 84; RT, pp.
265-267; 371-375, 376-387 (see particularly pp. 381-382).
It
appears from the Bench Decision that the court did not include
engineering costs in December. The Bench Decision on p. 12 at 1.
16 refers to "some 65,000 or 70,000" dollars of overhead costs.
The court appears to have accepted the beginning date for the
assessment of liquidated damages as January 8 and the ending date
as June 13.
That is consistent with the Statement of Stipulated
Facts, items 13 and 17.
A copy of the Statement of Stipulated
Facts is attached hereto in the Addendum under Tab A.
86

RT, p. 268, 11. 22-24.
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estimated that the accurate actual value of work remaining to be
completed was closer to $350,000, which would have resulted in a
percentage

of

completion

as

of

January

13

of

more

than

89

percent."
Mr. Nye testified on direct examination as a witness for UDOT
that 1:he late completion of the Black Rock Project precipitated
overtime and required him to split. his crew between the Black Hock
Project and the Kasler or Lakepoint Project to perform inspection
and surveying."

Mr.

Nye further testified from his own records

regarding payroll of his engineering crew,

indicat.ing that he and

his crew divided their charges be·tween the Black Rock Project and
the KaslE~r Project in December 1985. 89

Mr. Nye test.ified that: he

and members of his engineering crew inspected the project, checked
the proj ect every day, documen1:ed pay items, and administered the
contract.~

have

been

further

These activities took away from duties that he could
performing

that

Gail

on

Leary,

othE,r

projects. 91

Debbie

(an

office

Mr.

Nye

person),

testified
and

Dale

Tischner checked quantities during the week ending February 7,.'
and checked payrolls, which is something that UDOT would not have

8'1

RT, pp. 268-276.

8B

RT, p. 372.

8'1

R,]~ ,

9<)

RT, pp. 382-383.

9,

RT, p. 383, II. 23-25.

92

RT, p.384.

pp. 376-379; Ex. 89.

37

to do if the contractor had completed its work. 93

UDOT's crew

routinely totals tonnage tickets on a daily basis and double checks
them with the contractor to make sure their total jives on a daily
basis.~

UDOT would have to have an inspector and a payroll person

charging salaries to the Black Rock project if there was any work
going on. 95
On cross-examination by Reliance's counsel, Mr. Nye admitted
that the totals of the tonnage tickets have to be done regardless
of

when

the

Project

is

complete.%

He

also

confirmed

from

information on Exhibit 34 that between January 14 and March 31,
Young worked only nine days.
Margaret Dammaschke, an accountant for UDOT, testified that
Exhibits 64 and 65 list all charges for engineering construction
for the Black Rock Project for the period of January through June
of 1986, and for the month of December
that

on

federally-funded

projects,

1985.~

UDOT

She also testified

employees

charge

particular project which is identified by a charge I.D.
Those

charges

are

then

billed

participating percentage. 98
93

RT, p. 384-385.

~

RT, pp. 385-386

95

RT, pp. 389-390.

to

the

federal

a

Number.

government

On cross-examination Ms.

to

on

a

Dammaschke

% RT, p. 396, 11. 1-9.
~

RT, p. 408-410; See also Ex. 84.

98
RT, p. 408, 1. 24 through p. 409, 1.5.
This testimony
appears to be the basis for the court's statement in its Bench
Decision at p. 12, 11. 14-22.
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acknOYlledged

that

Exhibit

64

showed

the

total

figure

for

the

engineering costs coded to the Black Rock Project for the period
involved, and that it is not possible to tell from those totals how
they correspond to the various engineering activities that "Iere
being performed by the engineering crews.

She also acknowledged

that one cannot distinguish from the general ledger whether the
engineering

crews

are

performing

inspection

or

calculat:ing

materials. 99
It is clear from the marshalling of the evidence in suppori: of
the court's Finding No.
$65,000

shown

on

30 that 1:he court found that all of the

Exhibit

"continuing overhead"

64

constituted

incurred by UDOT,

the

actual

damages

or

and that $65,000 bears a

reasonable relationship to the :?93, 600 of liquidated damages.

That

finding is clearly erroneous because it is induced by an erroneous
view

of

evidence

3.

the

law I ()()

and

is

against

the

clear

weight

of

the

101
4

Finding No.

30 is induced l~m erroneous view of the law.

The law governing this issue is the contract between UDOT and
Young,

which provides for

overhead"
overhead."

~

989

incurred

by

liquidated damages for the "increased

UDOT.

Finding

30

refers

to

"continuinq

There is a difference between increased overhead and

RT, pp. 411-412.

100 Western Capital and Securities, Inc. v. Knudsvig, 768 P.2d
(Utah App. 1989), cert denied 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989).
1(1

Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.,

1989) .
39

776 P.2d 896

(Utah

continuing overhead.

The

testimony

elicited

by

Reliance

from

UDOT's own employees and witnesses is that Exhibit 64 shows total
overhead expenses, not just those incurred as a result of the late
completion.
Mr. Nye, UDOT's project engineer,

testified that several of

the activities of his crew during the period of January to June
1986 were activities that the crew would have performed whether or
not the project had been finished on time. lm

He also testified

that the majority of the crew's work during the winter months was
for just such activities that would have been done--and the costs
incurred--no

matter

when

the

proj ect

was

finished.

Of

IOJ

the

$65,029.79 in engineering costs, the largest amounts were incurred
dur ing the winter months.

l()l

Moreover, the engineering costs for January 1 through 8 should
be deducted from the $65,029.79, because actual damages should be
computed

only

for

through June 13.

the

liquidated

damages

period

of

January

9

This deduction further widens the gap between the

liquidated damages and actual damages.
Young worked only nine days during the period from January 14
to March 31. lru

Therefore, according to the testimony of Mr. Nye,

the type of costs that UDOT

incurred when Young was working--

1m

RT, pp. 200-203. See also note 18 on page 8 of this brief.

IW

RT, p. 202, 1. 25 through p. 203, 1. 7.

104

Ex. 64.

105

RT, pp. 396-397; Ex. 34.

see also RT, pp. 262-263.
40

inspection,

verifying

payroll,

checking

quantities

(tonnage

tickets) on a daily basis, and administering the contract--should
not have accrued.

Yet, by far the largest amount of engineering

costs shown on Exhibit 64 is the amount incurred during January,
February, and March 1986: a total of $47,206.16 of the $65,029.79.
It is clear from these facts t:hat a large portion, perhaps the
majority, of UDOT's engineering costs of $65,029.79 were costs that
UDOT would have incurred whether or not the Project ran over in
time.

The

$65,029.79

was

not,

by

a

large margin,

"increased

overhead."
4. Finding No. 30 is Against the Clear Weight of All the Evid,"nce.
Regarding Engineering Costs
Finding No. 30 completely oVE,rlooks the weighty testimony of
Mr. Nye elicited by Reliance, referred to above.

The finding also

overlooks the critical testimony of Ms. Dammaschke that Exhibits 64
and 65 represent total engineering costs and do not reflect the
types of activities performed by t:he engineering crew.

The clear

weight of all the evidence is that UDO'I"s "increased overhead" was
much smaller than $65,000.
This weight of evidence cannot be disregarded on the basis
that

1:he

court

assessed

the

credibility of

the

witnesses

decided to disregard the testimony of Reliance witnesses.

and
The

evidence disregarded by the court consists of testimony of UDOT's
own witnesses.

This Court therefore is not required to give the

same deference to the trial court's finding as it would had this
case involved conflicting testimony from witnesses for opposing
parties, and the court had resolved the conflicts by an assessment.
41

of the witnesses' credibility. I'"
C. The liquidated Damages Do Not Bear A Reasonable
Relationship to UDOT's Actual Damaqes
1. UDOT's Liquidated Damages are a Penalty
The majority of Utah cases dealing with liquidated damages are
real estate contract cases. 1()7
cases

treating

contracts,

liquidated

particularly

any

Reliance has not found any Utah

damages
case

provisions
involving

in

the

construction
assessment

of

liquidated damages under a construction contract that has achieved
substantial completion.
Of the liquidated damages cases decided by this Court, perhaps
the most analogous to this case is Western Macaroni Mfg.
Fiore ..

I~

Co. v.

The pertinent facts are that the macaroni company and

Fiore entered into a contract whereby the company agreed to sell
such amounts of macaroni as Fiore required in his business as a
retail dealer, and
. not to sell to any private consumer or
to any boarding house keeper in or out of the
state of Utah, and .
not to sell to any
other proprietor of an Italian store in Salt
Lake city, Utah, directly or indirectly, any
of
its products without the consent of
[Fiore], and in default or violation thereof
[company] undertakes and agrees to pay to
[Fiore] the sum of five hundred dollars
($500.00) as damages, in the premises,
The macaroni company sold macaroni to Fiore, but Fiore failed

I'" In re: Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah
App. 1988).
1()7

Robbins v. Finlay. supra, at 626, n. 5.

I~

47 Utah 108, 151 P. 984 (Utah 1915).
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to pay.
the

Upon the company's suit for payment, Fiore asserted that

company

had

Italian grocery
liquidated

in fact

macaroni,

macaroni,

macaroni

stores,

damages.

company had
broken

sold

not

and

The

to

private

therefore

trial

court

consumers

that
found

he was
that

sold macaroni as alleged,
recognized

on

the

market

entitled to
the

macaroni

but that
as

other

it was

merchantable

and that the company ha.d not sold the macaroni to any

Italian store to which Fiore bad been selling.
further

and

found

that

the

$500.00

damages

The trial court

provided

for

in

the

agreement was a penalty and not: liquidated damages.
This Court affirmed, stating,
The general rule is that, where an agreement
imposes several distinct duties or obligations
of different degrees of importance, and the
same sum is named as damages for the breach of
either
indifferently,
the
sum
is
to be
regarded as a penalty. 109
In Perkins v. Spencer this Court discussed Fiore:
The forfeiture appeared to apply to any breach
of the contract which might be of varying
degrees of importance.
He was held that the
$500. 00 forfeiture provision was a penalty
provision which could not be enforced." o
The case now before the court has significant similarities to
Fiore.

Like the contract in Fi9re,

UDOT's contract with Young

imposes liquidated damages of a fixed amount whether or not the
work has achieved sUbstantial completion and whether or not the
uncompleted work

109
110

is

trivial

in scope or dollar value.

151 P. at 985-986 (citation omitted).

243 P.2d at 450.
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UDOT's

specification purports to assess this $600 a day penalty "for each
calendar day after a specified completion date that any work shall
remain uncompleted"lll and to continue the
work on the project shall be completed,

assessment until "all
even if such work is of

,,112

little importance to the public's safe and

convenient use of the

roadway.
The largest item of work that remained to be completed after
January 13, 1986, and the item that was the major factor in UDOT's
assessment of liquidated damages, was the topsoil work.

The

topsoil work was an extremely small percentage of the total work on
the

Project.

The

dollar

amount

of

the

topsoil

work

was

$149,145 113 --about one and one-half percent of the total contract
value--and it was not critical to the public's safe or convenient
use of the roadway.
Fiore,

this

Like the macaroni company's peccadillo in

lapse by Young was minimal

and did not

justify a

penalty of $600 per day.
The liquidated damages provision is a penalty also because it
does not distinguish between work before substantial completion and
work

after

assessed.

substantial
That

fact

completion--the

alone

is

same

sufficient

$600

per

day

is

grounds

for

showing

unreasonableness in most jurisdictions that have considered the
issue,

III

112

particularly the united states Government agencies that

Ex. 4 , § 108.08 (emphasis added).
Ex. 4,

§

108.06; see also RT, p. 169, 11. 12-18.

113 RT, pp. 268-269; Ex. 35.
The transcript appears to be in
error in referring to Exhibit 3 on p. 269, 1. 3.
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specialize in construction contrac·t issues.

(See the discussion of

sUbstantial completion in Point I of this Brief.)
A case from Washington witch facts quite similar to this case
In S.L. Rowland Construction Company v. Beall

is illustrative.

Pipe and Tank Corporation ll4 the court closely examined an action by
a

surety

and

Washington,
pipeline.
four and

its

growing

contractor
out

of

a

against

the

City

of

Everett.,

contract

for

construction

one-half months period between the time the pipeline was
During that:

time punch list work and landscaping were being performed.
court denied

liquidated damages

and the

appellate

affirmed, stating:
A liquidated dama'Jes clause becomes a
penalty when the amount fixed has an in
terrorem effect of inducing performance rather
than compensating loss.
Manaqement. Inc. v.
Shassberger, supra [39 Wash. 2d 321, 326, 235
P.2d 293 (1951)]; Brower v. Garrison, 2 Wash.
App. 424, 433, 468 P.2d 469 (1970).
This is
such a case.
* * *
We hold that a liquidated damages clause
in a pipeline construction contract, which
requires the contractor to pay the same $150
daily rate of damages after the pipeline was
put into full operation as before, amounted to
a penalty after the pipeline was put into full
use.
The clause was, therefore, invalid
insofar as it purported to determine damages
after the line was put into full use by the
municipality.
Psat'L..j' Fuhrman v. Housing
Authority, 76 R.I. 87, 68 A.2d 32, 38, 10
A.L.R.2d 789
(1950); continental Illinois
'"

a

The city counter-claimed for liquidated damages for the

put into operation and the date of final acceptance.

trial

of

540 P.2d 912 (Wash. App. 1975).
45

The
court

National Bank & Trust
101 F. Supp. 755, 758,
Minmar Builders, Inc.,
~ 95,
99 (1972).
It
law:

Co. v. United states,
121 ct. Cl. 203 (1952) i
CCH Bd. Cont. App. Dec.
is literally hornbook

In
drafting
liquidated
damages
clauses, care should be taken to see
that, if the clause applies to breaches
of varying seriousness, the amount to be
paid is adjustable to fit the probable
damage.
C. McCormick, Damages § 156 (1935).
This
clause was not so drafted although the daily
rate of liquidated damages could have been
easily
varied
to
reflect
the
entirely
different range of potential damage that would
exist once the line went into operation. III
Likewise, in this case, the same $600 a day assessment applied even
after the roadway was available for full and unrestricted use by
the traveling public, and it applied to such minor items as topsoil
and seeding work.

UDOT could have reduced the liquidated damages

for the period after the project achieved sUbstantial completion.
Like the liquidated damages in Rowland, UDOT's liquidated damages
are a penalty.
2.
The burden of proving the unreasonableness of liguidated
damages should be upon the proponent of the damages, where the
liquidated damages provision, as applied, is in doubt
The Court in Fiore acknowledged that,
When the question of whether a contract
provides a penalty or liquidated damages is in
doubt,
the
contract
ordinarill
will
be
regarded as providing a penalty. II
This rule

is consistent with the observation of this

III

540 P.2d at 921-922.

116

151 P.

at 986.
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Court in

Robbins v. Finlay, that liquidated damages provisions are viewed
wi th some degree of suspicion because they may not reasonably
approx ima te

compensatory

damages. 117

Nevertheless,

Electric Sign Co. v. united Standard west, this Court placed the
burden on the party challenging the liquidated damages to show that
there

is

no

liquidated
burden,

reasonable

damages ."8

relationship
Reliance

as discussed below.

But

between

believes

it.

compensatory
has

carried

and
that

Reliance urges this Court to

apply to this case the rule recognized in Fiore:

that where ·the

liquidated damages provision, as applied, is in doubt, t:he burden
should be upon its proponent to show it is not a penalty.

This

rule is particularly appropriate in construction contract cases
such a '- this one where,
.~

first,

the contract does not reduce the

amount of liquidated damages after the project is available for its
intended use,

and second,

the same amount of liquidated damaqes

applies to failures of varying importance.
3. UDOT's liguidated damages are grossly disproportionate to its
actual damages as a matter of law.
The most that UDOT can possibly claim in actual damages, under
any interpretation of the facts, is the $65,029.79 in engineering
costs shown on Exhibit 64 for the period of January through June,
1986, and referred to by the trial court in its Bench Decision. l19
That amount

is only 69.6 percent of the

117

645 P.2d at 625.

118

755 P.2d at 164.

119

Bench Decision at 12.
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liquidated damages of

$93,600.

Reliance has demonstrated above lw that a large portion,

if not a majority,

of UDOT's alleged actual damages are normal

costs that UDOT would have incurred whether or not
been completed on time.
damages

and

actual

Therefore,

damages

is

not

~he

Project had

the gap between liquidated
simply between

$93,600

and

$65,000, but between $93,600 and a much smaller figure.
In Johnson v.

Carman,

this Court struck down a

liquidated

damages provision that would have assessed $34,596 where actual
damages were $25,650, or about 74 percent of the liquidated damage
amount.

The liquidated damages provision can be struck down as a

matter of law.

At the very least, because the liquidated damages

are clearly in the doubtful range under Utah case law, the burden
should be on UDOT to prove they are reasonable.
4. UDOT's Liquidated Damages are Unreasonable as Applied to the
Amount of Work Remaininq to be Completed.
In addition to this yawning gap between actual and liquidated
damages, the unreasonableness of the liquidated damages can also be
seen by comparing them to the volume of work left to be done at the
time the liquidated damages started accruing.

John Nye's testimony

placed the maximum amount of work remaining to be performed after
January 13, 1986, at approximately $350,000. 121
about 3.5 percent of the total project.

That amount is only

Mr. Nye acknowledged that

IW As discussed in more detail on page 8 of this Brief,
this
$65,029.79 figure even includes charges for work which UDOT would
have performed regardless of when the Project was accepted.

RT, pp. 267-276; See also testimony of Richard E. Tasker,
who placed the amount of work remaining as of December 7, 1985, at
about $175,000, or between 1.9 percent and 3.1 percent.
RT, pp.
308-314.
121
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the pE,rcentage left to be completed could go down as a result of
in quantities. ln

underruns

The proposed liquidated damages

of

$93,600 are nearly 27 percent of 1:he value of the remaining work,
while UDOT's total overhead costs are estimated to be ten percent
of the project cost .123

Even the actual engineering costs allegedly

incurred by UDOT--$65,0029.79--is 18.6 percent of the value of the
remaining work.

These amounts are so unreasonably out of line with

the normal percentage for UDOT's total overhead that the disparity
bears out Reliance's other proof that the actual damages are in
realit:y

much

underscores

lower
the

than

The

alleged.

absurdi ty

of

disproportion
liquidated

assessing

also

damages

purportedly based upon "increased overhead" of nearly $100,000 to
complete $350,000 of work. 124
CONCLUSION
1'he

lower

court

erred"

as

a

matter

substantial

completion

is

not

the

law

SUbstantial

completion

is

the

law

in

law,
in

authori ty"

utah

Utah,

completion is accepted in all jurisdictions,

in

(2)

ruling

1:hat

because

(1)

substantial

(3) UDOT's "contrary

also recognizes SUbstantial completion and does not

preclude its application in this case, and (4) in refusing to apply
the doctrine of substantial completion, the lower court sanctioned

In

RT pp. 307-308.

113

RT, P . 193; Ex. 12.

124
The average tax payer would be shocked to learn that,
according to UDOT,
for every dollar spent for the ac1:ual
construction of a highway, it costs UDOT nearly 30 cents to oversee
that construction--and that after the highway is opened for use!
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the enforcement of an improper penalty.
Further, because the alleged harm was capable and very easy to
estimate, the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in ruling that
the liquidated damage clause was enforceable.
Finally,

because

the

actual

damages

bear

no

relationship to the liquidated damages and result

reasonable

in a penalty

under Utah law, the lower court erred in finding that there was a
reasonable relationship and that the liquidated damages provisions
was

The

enforceable.

trial

court's

finding

that

there

is

a

reasonable relationship between actual and liquidated damages

lS

against

an

the

great

weight

of

erroneous view of the law.

evidence

Moreover,

and

was

induced

by

the burden of proving the

unreasonableness of the liquidated damages should be upon UDOT
under these circumstances; UDOT's liquidated damages are grossly
disproportionate

to

its

actual

damages;

and

UDOT' s

liquidated

damages are unreasonable as applied to the amount of work remaining
to be completed.
Based on the foregoing substantial and persuasive reasons,
Appellant

Reliance

Insurance

Company

respectfully

sUbmits

this

Appellant's Brief for the Court's consideration and determination,
and requests a reversal of the lower court's ruling.
DATED this

24+h

day of

Jal1lA.£(n(

, 1992.

I

FETZER, HENDRICKSON & SIMONSEN

Attorneys for Appellant Reliance
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